PENGARUH DINAMIKA INTERNAL DAN EKSTERNAL UNI EMIRAT ARAB DALAM PENGAMBILAN KEBIJAKAN NORMALISASI UNI EMIRAT ARAB-ISRAEL
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8035819Kata Kunci:
Abraham Accords, Israel-UAR Normalization, Internal-Eksternal SettingAbstrak
The objective of this research is to analyze the weight of United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) Internal and External Setting put into UEA Decision in normalizing their diplomatic ties with Israel. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin foreign policy theory of internal-external setting being used to analyze this research. Moreover, the normalization approach from Barston being used to apprehend the normalization between Israel and UAE. For the research methodology, qualitative methods being used with majority of the data come from secondary sources. This research ascertains that there are several internal and external setting playing role into the normalization. For instance, the internal setting could be seen in UEA security threat coming from its geographical location which sandwiched between two biggest regional powers. As for the external setting, the situation in Middle East and Trump Endeavour to get US allies in Middle East closer with Israel is playing a significance role in the normalization. For decades, UAE and Israel share animosity towards Iran, thus giving Israel and UAE a ground to team up against Iran. In the other hand, Iran and Muslim Brotherhood share anthypathy towards monarchy of UAE, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Bahrain, thus builds up tension between to parties in a long term. UEA has some significance interest in strengthening ties with Israel. But come a question, when is the right moment to formalize their relation? How to normalize without severing UAE ties with fellow Arab Nations? This polemic found its conclusion when White House proposed Peace to Prosperity Plan. Despite the rejection at arrival, Trump Peace to Prosperity Plan provides a pretext for UAE to normalize their ties with Israel without seemingly put Palestinian issues under the bus.
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